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“. . . Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Peace . . .”
—The Influence of Constitutional Argument on
Same-Sex Marriage Legislation Debates in Australia
Neville Rochow*
I. INTRODUCTION
The bankruptcy of courtesy and respect in Australian public
discourse represents one of the major inhibitors of free speech. 1 This
has been particularly noticeable in recent debates regarding same-sex
marriage. Accuracy was the first casualty, and the character of the
opponent followed closely behind. Anticipation of public personal
attacks by opponents discouraged some with strongly held values
from speaking up publicly. Debate was thus less informed and less
balanced. This lack of courtesy and respect stands in stark contrast
with the best traditions and practices of institutional debate, such as
those found in the courts and legislatures. A mechanism had to be
found to bring the debate back from the brink of total abandonment
of rational, respectful debate. The presentation of constitutional
argument appears, in some measure, to have done that.
Correctly functioning, the adversarial systems manifested in both
legal and parliamentary procedure, inherited from Britain, have
proven in Australia to be effective means for weighing alternatives
and giving opposing views equal opportunity to persuade. The

* SC, LLB (Hons), LLM (Adelaide), LLM (Deakin), Barrister. This article seeks to
present the position as at March 2013. The writer is indebted to his colleague at the South
Australian Bar, Christopher Brohier, who made significant contributions to the submissions we
made together before parliamentary committees and to legislators.
1. Another potential inhibitor to free speech is anti-discrimination legislation, as
exemplified in the now withdrawn federal Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012
currently under committee review. There were fundamental questions as to its constitutional
validity and clarity of drafting, as well as its departure from principles in relation to the standard
of proof. See WILBERFORCE FOUND., SUBMISSION OF THE WILBERFORCE FOUNDATION TO THE
SENATE INQUIRY IN RELATION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BILL 2012,
(Dec. 21, 2012),
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_
ctte/anti_discrimination_2012/report/e01.htm; see also Augusto Zimmerman, Religious
Vilification Laws in Australia: Philosophical Underpinnings and Constitutional Implications, 2014 BYU L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013).
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dialectic of properly regulated debate exposes both strengths and
weaknesses of competing cases to the arbiter so that a reasoned
decision is more likely than might have been possible through
unilateral inquiry into that same issue.
Court processes, closely following English models, are, certainly
in theory and largely in practice, respectful and courteous affairs.
Between bar and bench, among the advocates appearing for the
adversaries and in the examination of witnesses, communications in
court, as a general rule order, are polite and respectful. This derives
from long-held traditions and well-established rules as to court
manner, content, and form.
In theory, though perhaps less so in practice, the Westminster
parliamentary system is also governed by traditions, rules, and
procedures for the orderly presentation of both sides of a debate. The
system is marked by a separation of the judicial arm of government
from the legislative and executive arms. However, the executive arm
is kept in check by the legislature through the principle of
“responsible government.” 2
The concept of “responsible government” provides that the
executive, represented through members who are also Ministers of

2. The concept of “responsible government” in a federal system, combining a governing
lower house and a powerful elected Senate, was unique to Australia in 1901. The British
Parliament had long practised this form of government, in a unitary system, with an appointed
upper house, (the House of Lords), requiring Ministers of the Crown to be members of
Parliament who were “responsible” to Parliament for their executive decisions and actions. The
Ministers were permitted to govern only so long as the government had the confidence of the
House–traditionally reflected in having a majority of members in the lower house. Once
confidence was “lost,” Parliament would be prorogued by the monarch and a general election
would be called. This was the system of parliamentary democracy with which the framers of the
Australian federal constitution were most familiar. A deliberate decision was made during
drafting to adopt and superimpose that system upon a federal structure rather than adopting a
federal model such as that found in the United States and Switzerland. See Colin Howard &
Cheryl Saunders, The Blocking of the Budget and Dismissal of the Government, in LABOR AND THE
CONSTITUTION 1972–1975: ESSAYS AND COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES
OF THE WHITLAM YEARS IN AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT 251, 266, 274–79 (Gareth Evans ed. 1977);
see also R. J. Ellicott, Commentaries, in LABOR AND THE CONSITITUTION 1972–1975: ESSAYS AND
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES OF THE WHITLAM YEARS IN AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT 288 (quoting OWEN DIXON, JESTING PILATE 107 (1944)) (“We, under our
conception of democracy, so far separating the executive and the legislature, insist on the
dependence of Cabinet upon Parliament. We insist too that if a difficulty arises between the
executive government and Parliament, it shall be resolved by an appeal to the people, and we
place on the representative of the Sovereign the responsibility of saying whether the case is one
for the dissolution of Parliament and general election. This we do because we have proudly
preserved the monarchy at the apex of our constitutional system.”).
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the Crown, responds and accounts to Parliament on the floor of
Parliament, by honest and frank answers to questions posed by
members of the legislature. 3 In fact, one of the boasts of the
Westminster system is holding the executive to account through
“question time.” 4 During question time, non-government ranks,
particularly the opposition, are permitted to ask of members of
Cabinet, representing the executive, questions on matters of
governance and policy. Question time is at its finest when
“questions on notice” are answered at Westminster. 5 The questions
are given some weeks in advance to the executive with respect to
issues in a particular portfolio. 6 Under current practices, each
question is assigned a number and, when Parliament is in session to
answer questions on notice, the members of the opposition stand
and call out the assigned numbers in sequence. The relevantly
responsible secretary then approaches the dispatch box and gives the
answer. Debate is thus informed and orderly, allowing little need or
opportunity for personal attack or insult in either the question or the
answer.
However, outside the courts and parliament, the tone of debate
is quite different, particularly with respect to same-sex marriage. It is
regrettable that the tenor of public discourse in Australia has
degenerated into the ad hominem attack. Instead of dealing with
issues, too often and too readily there is name calling. Opponents of
same-sex marriage have had their views unfairly reported and
inaccurately represented, and have been personally vilified and
denigrated so readily that the debate has quickly become personal,
shrill, and vicious. Points under debate and relevant facts become
secondary. Too easily are labels like “bigot,” “fanatic,” “homophobe,”
3. The Governor-General, as the monarch’s representative, acts on the “advice” of
Cabinet while it maintains confidence of the House. The constitutional conventions that define
this relationship have come through British practices and procedures, modified over time to suit
the federal structure. See H. V. EVATT & LESLIE ZINES, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE (1987); see also
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 62, 64.
4. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PRACTICE 543 (6th ed. 2012)
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/05%20About%20Parliament/53%20HoR/
532%20PPP/Practice6/PDF/Chapters/6Chap15.ashx.
5. In Australia, question time is still embarrassingly marred by personal insult and
invective on both sides of the chamber. See Peter Costello, Standard of Debate Nothing to Laugh
About, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics
/standard-of-debate-nothing-to-laugh-about-20120911-25qet.html.
6. UK PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/business/questions/ (last
visited Aug. 9, 2013).
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and “misogynist” employed to gain perceived forensic advantage when
they serve no useful or proper purpose in the dialectic of informed
argument. 7
How could both sides be heard fairly in this climate of verbal
pugilism? Value-neutral arguments, based upon the constitution,
were needed. Groups of lawyers concerned that the debate over the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage legislation was being
suppressed decided to focus on the legislation’s constitutional
validity. 8 Submissions made to legislatures opposing such legislative
measures were careful to distinguish between the constitutional
arguments and those based upon values. While constitutional
argument has not muted all vitriolic attack, or guaranteed either
accuracy or balance in reporting of the debate, it has provided a
logical framework upon which debate can proceed. It has, at least,

7. See, e.g., Neville Rochow, Turning the Tide on Same-Sex Marriage, 33 AUSTL. FAMILY 5
(2012) available at http://www.family.org.au/index.php/afa-journal/116-afa-journal-vol-33-no-32012/204-turning-the-tide-on-same-sex-marriage-a-case-study-of-the-arguments-presented-intasmania; Katherine Spackman, Abuse and Demonisation of Gay Marriage Opponents Must Stop,
AUSTL. CHRISTIAN LOBBY (July 14, 2011), http://www.acl.org.au/2011/07/mr-abuse-anddemonisation-of-gay-marriage-opponents-must-stop/; Heath Aston & Dan Harrison, Christian
Groups Welcome Gay Marriage Referendum, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (April 29, 2013),
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/christian-groups-welcome-gay-marriagereferendum-20130429-2io0q.html; Peter Wicks, To the Extreme with “Hard” Cori Bernardi,
INDEPENDENT AUSTL. (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.independentaustralia.net/2012/politics/tothe-extreme-with-hard-cory-bernardi/; see also Tony Abbott will never be Prime Minister; FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Tony-Abbott-will-never-be-prime-minister/274330505796
(last visited Aug. 9, 2013).
8. The lawyers making the submissions were a loose association. Among the lawyers
groups that made submissions were, initially, Lawyers for the Preservation of the Definition of
Marriage (which included the author). This group grew to include a number of senior barristers,
solicitors, and leading academic lawyers from across the country. They were joined in federal
Parliamentary submissions by the Ambrose Centre. Others joined as part of the Tasmanian group,
the Save Marriage Coalition, formed by former Senator Guy Barnett, which included lawyers,
church, social and business groups. The lawyers made the first round of submissions in order to
delineate between the constitutional arguments and those that were contestable on the basis of
evidence or values. See Rochow, supra note 7, at 5–6. Upon invitation from the New South Wales
Legislative Assembly, a submission was made by Lawyers for the Preservation of the Definition of
Marriage. That submission was supportive of the submissions made by the other groups. Those
expressing a view against the constitutionality of the proposed law included eminent
constitutional lawyer David Jackson QC, who submitted on behalf of the New South Wales
Attorney General’s Department. New South Wales Department of Attorney General and Justice,
Inquiry into Same Sex Marriage Law in NSW, Submission 1240 (Mar. 8, 2013), available at
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/28F03B123C7637C1CA25
7B2D000652DC.
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diluted the effect of ad hominem attacks as a distraction from principal
issues.
Originally, the public debate concentrated principally on whether
legislation permitting same-sex marriage should be passed. 9 These
arguments could largely be advanced in any jurisdiction. And it
seemed a debate destined to be won by the loudest and last to speak.
Introduction of constitutional arguments, however, raised the less
obvious but logically anterior question: whether same-sex marriage
laws could validly be passed. Submissions before a federal House of
Representatives select committee, 10 a federal Senate select
committee,11 the Tasmanian Legislative Council,12 members of the
South Australian Legislative Council, and the New South Wales
Legislative Council committee 13 have shown that arguments as to
why legislation should not be passed are not effective in persuading
undecided legislators unless combined with reasons why the
legislation could not be validly passed.
This Article first deals with constitutional arguments at the
federal legislative level and then at the state level as to why same-sex
marriage legislation could not be validly passed. The Article then deals
with how those arguments relate to why the legislation should not be
passed. Finally, the Article makes some observations about the
significance of constitutional arrangements in the way that western
democracies can and should be governed.
The broad range of arguments that were advanced against state
same-sex legislation in Tasmania has been the subject of treatment
by this author elsewhere. 14 Similar arguments were advanced
9. Mary Anne Neilsen, Same-sex Marriage, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL. (Feb. 10, 2012),
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/
pubs/BN/2011-2012/SameSexMarriage.
10. Inquiry into the Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2012 and the Marriage Amendment Bill
2012, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES,
http://www.aph.gov.au/P
arliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=spla/bill%20
marriage/index.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2013).
11. Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2010: Submissions Received by the Committee,
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., SENATE COMMITTEES,
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/S
enate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2010-13/marriage_equality_2012/submissions.htm.
12. Rochow, supra note 7.
13. Same Sex Marriage Law in NSW (Inquiry), PARLIAMENT OF NEW S. WALES,
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/samesexmarriage (last visited Aug. 9, 2103).
14. Rochow, supra note 7, at 5. Those arguments can be summarized as follows:
The legislation was in breach of an electoral promise not to introduce it.
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subsequently, though less formally, with members of Parliament in
South Australia, where no parliamentary inquiry has been held. They
were also presented to the New South Wales Legislative Council
inquiry. 15 In Tasmania, the arguments were not confined to the
constitutional arguments under consideration here, but included
value-based arguments as well. However, the presence of the
constitutional arguments lent strength to the other value-based
arguments that were presented. 16
Before turning to the constitutional arguments as outlined, it is
useful to make a few observations concerning one of the arguments
advanced in opposition to legislation permitting same-sex marriage.
Opponents argue that passage of the legislation undermines
freedoms of religion, speech, thought, and practice according to
conscience. 17 The implicit premise in this argument (and the
concern underlying it) is that once passed, the same-sex marriage
legislation will combine with anti-discrimination legislation 18 to
produce new legal burdens on religion. Specifically, it would become
unlawful for those with strongly held beliefs concerning the
wrongness of homosexual relations to refuse to solemnize such
marriages or to preach against them. 19 The counter has been the
promise by proponents of same-sex marriage to exempt religions
from any obligation to perform same-sex ceremonies. This promise
of exemption has been regarded with suspicion by opponents as
either a temporary sop in exchange for passage and that, in practice,
will not go far enough to protect their rights. 20

There would be considerable doubt as to the constitutional validity of a state Act.
If there were to be any such legislation, it should be a matter to be resolved federally and not
state by state. If necessary, a national referendum should be held to amend the constitution and
to test the will of the electorate under section 128 of the federal Constitution.
The Tasmanian bill had serious drafting and logical flaws.
The passing of an invalid law would give rise to potentially expensive constitutional litigation
involving both the state and individuals.
Marriage is a bed-rock social institution worthy of protection.
Claims that same-sex marriage is a human right have no foundation.
The asserted international trend is illusory.
The legislation posed a threat to free speech when combined with anti-discrimination
legislation.
The law has an educative role and this form of legislation sends a wrong message to the
community.
15. Same Sex Marriage Law in NSW (Inquiry), supra note 13.
16. See Rochow, supra.note 7.
17. See WILBERFORCE FOUND., supra note 1; Zimmerman, supra note 1; Rochow, supra note 7.
18. See Zimmerman, supra note 1.
19. Id.
20. See WILBERFORCE FOUND., supra note 1; Zimmerman, supra note 1; Rochow, supra note 7.
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At first blush the argument that same-sex legislation would
impair liberties previously enjoyed by individuals appears to derive
from a perception as to how anti-discrimination legislation might be
used to enforce a new dimension of political correctness if same-sex
marriage were to be accorded the same legal standing as existing
heterosexual marriage. Any new right to have a same-sex
relationship solemnized as a marriage would inevitably impact, in
some way, upon previously existing rights to preach against change
to the status quo on marriage. The new right may even be designed
in such a way as to trump previously held rights, particularly if the
retention of those previous rights is seen to be inappropriate. In this
sense, this argument is a slippery-slope style appeal to retention of
status quo and could be advanced against any reform to marriage.
On closer analysis, however, this argument contains an added
sting that raises constitutional and political issues unique to
Australia. In Australia, the right to religious liberty is at best
tenuous as a matter of federal constitutional law. For peculiar
historical, social, and political reasons, Australia is one of the few
advanced democracies that has no federal bill of rights, entrenched
or otherwise. 21 Neither do the laws of the respective States and
Territories provide any constitutional guarantees of religious liberty.
While some jurisdictions have enacted religious anti-vilification
laws, the rights conferred are fraught with controversy as to how
they operate, what freedoms are conferred, and whether they, in
turn, are constitutionally valid. 22

21. Neville Rochow, Paying for Human Rights Before the Bill Comes: Towards a More
Comprehensive Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Norms in Australia, UNIV. OF
ADELAIDE L. SCH. (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356382; Paul Babie &
Neville Rochow, Feels Like Déjà vu: An Australian Bill of Rights and Religious Freedom, 2010 BYU L.
REV. 821 (2010) [hereinafter Déjà vu]; Paul Babie & Neville Rochow, Protecting Religious Freedom
under Bills of Rights: Australia as a Microcosm, in FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER BILLS OF RIGHTS

(2012) .
22. As to the difficulties in invoking the anti-vilification legislation, see the decision of
the Court of Appeal in Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. v Islamic Council of Victoria (2006) 15 VR
207 (Austl.). See also Nicholas Aroney, The Constitutional (In)Validity of Religious Vilification
Laws: Implications for their Interpretation 34 FED. L. REV. 287 (2006); Zimmerman, supra note 1;
Neil Foster, Anti-Vilification Laws and Freedom of Religion in Australia- Is Defamation Enough?,
Presentation at the Conference of the J. Reuben Clark Law Society and the Research Unit for
the Study of Law, Society and Religion (June 8, 2013). For general a commentary of the
protection of religious freedom in Australia, see CAROLYN MAREE EVANS, LEGAL PROTECTION
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA (2012), particularly chapter 8, which discusses cases,
including Catch the Fire.
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The only constitutional guarantee of religious liberty under
Australian law is contained in section 116 of the federal
Constitution. 23 Although section 116 bears a close resemblance to
the United States’ First Amendment from which it was drawn,
because it is not found in a bill of rights,24 it has been given a very
narrow construction:
[Section 116] does not form part of a Bill of Rights. The plaintiff’s
claim that it represents a personal guarantee of religious freedom
loses much of its emotive and persuasive force . . . s. 116 is a
denial of legislative power to the Commonwealth, and no more. 25

As observed by Paul Babie and me in our article, “Feels Like Déjà
Vu,” 26 opponents of a bill of rights commonly argued that existing
common law rights were sufficient protection of individual rights.
These opponents argued that a bill of rights would confer too much
power on unelected judges and would lead to a wave of “US-style”
rights litigation.27 It may seem ironic to some that the same
conservative religionists who were ardent opponents of a bill of rights
are arguing that their religious freedom would be compromised by
same-sex legislation. On one view, it would be those very opponents of
a bill of rights who now would stand to benefit most from a properly
drafted set of guarantees of religious freedom. A bill of rights could have
stood as a bulwark against the most feared effects of the new cocktail of
rights that could result if same-sex marriage legislation and the new
changes to discrimination laws proposed by the Human Rights and AntiDiscrimination Bill 2012 28 were to be passed. The feared “US-style” rights
litigation, of which opponents of bills of rights are so wont to warn,
23. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 116 (“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for
establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free
exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or
public trust under the Commonwealth.”).
24. See Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 86 ALJR 713; Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR
366; Adelaide Company of Jehovah Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR; Attorney General
(Victoria); ex rel. Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559; Church of the New Faith v Commissioner
for Payroll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 120; Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; Grace Bible
Church v Reedman (1984) 36 SASR 376; Harkianakis v Skalkos (1999) 47 NSWLR 302; see also
Rochow, supra note 21, at 16–17.
25. Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (DOGS Case) (1981) 146 CLR 559,
652.
26. Déjà vu, supra note 21.
27. See, e.g., Patrick Parkinson, Christian Concerns about an Australian Charter of Rights, in
FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER BILLS OF RIGHTS 117 (Paul Babie & Neville Rochow ed., 2012).
28. See WILBERFORCE FOUND., supra note 1.
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may well be upon us in any event with none of the protections that
might have otherwise existed.
All attempts to date to enact same-sex legislation have failed and
current state based bills seem likely to fail as well. The bills
presented in federal Parliament were overwhelmingly defeated,
including the most recent attempt to have internationally contracted
same-sex marriages recognized as being lawful in Australia. 29 The
Tasmanian bill was defeated in that State’s upper house, the
Legislative Council. 30 Additionally, from discussions that the author
has had with State political leaders and members of the respective
houses, current South Australian attempts to pass a state-based law
seem likely to be headed for defeat. Although it is uncertain whether
other States will attempt to pass bills, there are equivalent bills
being mooted in New South Wales and Western Australia. 31 The
most likely jurisdiction to pass a same-sex marriage bill is the
Australian Capital Territory because of the strength of the leftist
coalition of the Australian Labor Party and the Greens. 32 The tenure
of that legislation will be subject to federal territories power. 33
Because no bills have been passed, the validity and consequences
of same-sex marriage legislation remain contestable. Constitutional
arguments, experience teaches, have the capacity to sway undecided
legislators who oppose same-sex legislation but need an acceptable
value-neutral reason to vote against the bills. Thus, the constitution
operates as a brake on certain types of reform well before matters are
contested in court.

29. Chris Uhlmann, Parliament Votes Down Same-sex Marriage, ABC NEWS,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-19/parliament-votes-down-same-sex-marriage/4270700
(last updated Sept. 19, 2012); Foreign Same Sex Marriage Recognition Bill Defeated, AUSTL.
CHRISTIANS (June 20, 2013), http://australianchristians.com.au/foreign-same-sex-marriagerecognition-bill-defeated/.
30. Tasmania’s Upper House Votes Down Gay Marriage, ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au
/news/2012-09-27/tasmania-upper-house-votes-down-gay-marriage/4284538 (last updated
Sept. 28, 2012).
31. See, e.g., Same Sex Marriage Law in NSW (Inquiry), PARLIAMENT OF N.S.W.,
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/samesexmarriage (last visited Aug. 12, 2013); Same-Sex
Marriage Bill Set For Western Australia / Advocates Say Momentum ‘Unstoppable’, AUSTL. MARRIAGE
EQUAL. (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/tag/westernaustralia/.
32. See, e.g., ACT Marriage Equality and the Constitution, AUSTL. MARRIAGE EQUAL. (Dec. 12,
2012), http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/tag/australian-capital-territory/.
33. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 122.
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II. COULD VALID FEDERAL LEGISLATION BE PASSED PERMITTING SAMESEX MARRIAGE IN AUSTRALIA?
With only minor administrative exceptions, marriage has, since
1961, been regulated nationally by a single federal statute, the
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). Passed to overcome the confused condition
of matrimonial law when each state had its own laws, the Marriage
Act would seem to constitute the most significant barrier to same-sex
marriage legislation. However, if that Act were amended to redefine
marriage to embrace same-sex marriages, there would be no
impediment. If that Act has not driven state laws on the subject from
the legislative field entirely, then states could pass individual laws
permitting such marriages.
The Marriage Act operates to impede state-based marriage
legislation. Section 109 of the federal Constitution 34 provides that if
there are two otherwise valid state and federal enactments that
“cover[] the field,” the federal law will render the state law invalid to
the extent of that state law’s inconsistency. Prior to 1961, marriage
was a state matter and interstate recognition of matrimonial status
was a matter determined by a combination of private international
law and state-to-state comity. In 1961, the Marriage Act was passed
federally with the intention of creating a single marriage law for
Australia, with only very limited exceptions relating to the
registration of marriages. By this enactment, it would appear that the
federal parliament “covered the field” on the topic of marriage.
In 2004, the Marriage Act was amended to contain a definition of
marriage—the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all
others, voluntarily entered into for life—and to prohibit recognition
of same-sex marriages contracted overseas. 35 This amendment came
at a time when state-based same-sex marriage laws were not even in
contemplation. By this enactment, it would appear that the federal
parliament “covered the field” on the topic of the definition of marriage
for Australia.

34. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 109 (“When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of
the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be invalid.”).
35. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 88EA (introduced by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004
(Cth)). As to its effect, see Geoffrey Lindell, State Legislative Power to Enact Same-Sex Marriage
Legislation, and the Effect of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) as Amended by the Marriage Amendment
Act 2004 (Cth), CONST. L. & POL’Y REV. 25 (2006).
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The ability to amend the Marriage Act is therefore pivotal in the
constitutional debate as to whether same-sex marriage legislation
could be validly passed.
The debate over whether the Commonwealth Parliament should
legislate to allow same-sex marriages largely proceeded on an
assumption that it could; that is that the federal Parliament had the
power so to legislate. As is apparent from submissions made by legal
professional bodies, 36 the legal profession as a whole was not
prepared to challenge that assumption. Lawyers were simply not
putting the contrary case to the respective committees. As a
consequence, the “should” arguments were prevailing, almost by
default over arguments as to what the Parliament could do.
There has always been, however, a real question as to whether
Parliament possessed the power to legislate same-sex marriage in
section 51 (xxi) and (xxii) of the Constitution. The question is
whether the divorce and matrimonial power, though a separate and
distinct power, 37 could support a law allowing same-sex couples to
marry if that power were not found in section 51 (xxi). Section 51
(xxii) provides Parliament power to make laws with respect to
“divorce and matrimonial causes,” that is, causes arising out of
marriage. 38
If the power to legislate for same-sex marriage is not allowed
under the marriage power, unless another power can be found,
Parliament does not have the power to so legislate. Without an
express power, the matter has to be made the subject of a
referendum to amend pursuant to section 128 of the Constitution.

A. Constitutional Interpretation: Marriage Power and the Originalist
Approach
The High Court has recently reiterated:
[T]he task of statutory construction must begin with a
consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and
extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning

36. See Inquiry into the Marriage Amendment Bill 2012 and Marriage Equality Amendment Bill
2012, HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE ON SOC. POL’Y AND LEGAL AFF., http://www.aph.gov.au/parli

amentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=spla/bill%20marria
ge/index.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2013).
37. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxii); Re F; Ex Parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376, 401.
38. Re F; Ex Parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376, 401; see also id. at 407 (matrimonial causes are
“those matters which are subsidiary and consequential to marriage and divorce”).
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of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the
text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The
meaning of the text may require consideration of the context,
which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in
particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy. 39

When interpreting section 51 (xxii) of the Constitution, the
meanings of the “matrimonial cause” and “divorce” have no potential
for ambiguity. These phrases have been applied consistently without
question over at least a century. 40 In that time, they have never been
applied to any legal relationship other than traditional heterosexual
marriage. Nothing in the wording of the power suggests of anything
broader.
Even if one were to concede that those terms were ambiguous
and it became necessary to embark upon an originalist interpretation
of the constitutional phrases through a “search for the intention of
its makers,” 41 the result would not differ. In interpretation by
reference to historical context, the High Court distinguishes between
connotation and denotation, or the difference between meaning and
application. 42
In Ex parte Professional Engineers Association, Justice Windeyer said:
We must not, in interpreting the Constitution, restrict the
denotation of its terms to things they denoted in 1900. The
denotation of words becomes enlarged as new things falling within
their connotations come into existence or become known. But in
the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or
connotations of its words should remain constant. We are not to
give words a meaning different from any meaning which they could
have borne in 1900. . . . It is not to be changed as language
changes. 43

39. Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, 46
(footnote omitted).
40. Australian courts have accepted the definition current since at least the nineteenth
century when Lord Penzance pronounced his famous dictum in the divorce case of a polygamous
wife in Hyde v Hyde (1866) 1 P.D. 130, 133 (Eng.) (“I conceive that marriage, as understood in
Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one
woman, to the exclusion of all others.”). See also Fisher v Fisher (1986) 161 CLR 438, 456
(Austl.).
41. Re Wakim; Ex Parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 551.
42. Id. at 552.
43. (1959) 107 CLR 208, 267.; see also R v Brislan; Ex Parte Williams (1935) 54 CLR 262,
282 (Rich & Evatt, JJ).
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Parliament cannot deem what meaning may be given to a
particular power in the Constitution so as to expand its content.
Further, as was observed by Justice McHugh in Re Wakim:
[T]he judiciary has no power to amend or modernise the
Constitution to give effect to what the judges think is in the public
interest. The function of the judiciary, including the function of this
Court [the High Court], is to give effect to the intention of the
makers of the Constitution as evinced by the terms in which they
expressed that intention. That necessarily means that decisions, taken

almost a century ago by people long dead, bind the people of Australia today
even in cases where most people agree that those decisions are out
of touch with the present needs of Australian society. 44

Further, in Cormick v Cormick, 45 Chief Justice Gibbs observed:
It would be a fundamental misconception of the operation of the
Constitution to suppose that the Parliament itself could effectively
declare that particular facts are sufficient to bring about the
necessary connexion with a head of legislative power so as to justify
an exercise of that power. It is for the courts, and not for the
Parliament, to decide on the validity of legislation . . . . 46

Justices Mason, Wilson, Deane, and Dawson concurred in Chief
Justice Gibbs’s reasoning. 47 Two members of that unanimous court
(Justices Mason and Brennan) went on to later become Chief
Justices. 48 Of those two, Justice Brennan added additional reasoning,
“The scope of the marriage power conferred by section 51(xxi) of the
Constitution is to be determined by reference to what falls within
the conception of marriage in the Constitution, not by reference to
what the Parliament deems to be, or to be within, that
conception.” 49
With particular reference to the marriage power, Justice Brennan
(as his Honour then was) observed in Fisher v Fisher: 50

44. Re Wakim, 198 CLR at 549 (emphasis added).
45. (1984) 156 CLR 170.
46. Id. at 177.
47. Id. at 182.
48. Sir Anthony Mason was Chief Justice of Australia from 1987 to 1995. Sir Gerard
Brennan succeeded him as Chief Justice in 1995 and retired in 1998.
49. Id.
50. (1986) 161 CLR 438.
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Marriage is a social and legal institution. . . . The nature and
incidents of the legal institution which the Constitution recognises
as “marriage” and which lie within the power conferred by section
51(xxi) are ascertained not by reference to laws enacted in
purported pursuance of the power but by reference to the customs
of our society, especially when they are reflected in the common
law, which show the content of the power as it was conferred. The
words “with respect to” in section 51 in their application to the
marriage power are not needed to bring the customary incidents of
marriage within the power. On the other hand, those words do not
empower the Parliament to legislate upon the customary incidents
of marriage so as to affect the nature of the marriage relationship. 51

Justices Mason 52 and Deane, in Re F; Ex Parte F observed,
“Obviously, the Parliament cannot extend the ambit of its own
legislative powers by purporting to give to ‘Marriage’ an even wider
meaning than that which the word bears in its constitutional
context.” 53
Justice Dawson said, in relation to the provision of the Family
Law Act under consideration in Comick, deeming certain children to
be children of a marriage, “It is well established that the reach of a
legislative power cannot be extended by this means.” 54
From these dicta, it seems clear that Parliament cannot extend its
marriage power by mere definition. 55
A critical question to determine whether the Commonwealth
Parliament has power to legislate to permit same-sex couples to
marry is what was meant by “marriage” in 1900. Parliament has
power to make laws with respect to that relationship, but does not
have power to alter the nature of that relationship.

B. Analogies With Other Legal Concepts Receiving Originalist Interpretation
1. Analogy in trade mark law
In 1908, shortly after federation, in Attorney-General for the State of

51. Id. at 455–56 (emphasis added).
52. As his Honour then was.
53. (1986) 161 CLR 376, 389.
54. Id. at 465.
55. This is opposed to defining the content of a valid exercise within existing power,
which, arguably, is what it has done in defining marriage in the 2004 amendment to the
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth).
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New South Wales v Brewery Employees’ Union of New South Wales and
Ors, 56 the High Court considered the meaning of the words “trade
mark” in the phrase “worker’s trade mark” to determine whether it
was subject matter within the legislative power with respect to
trademarks under section 51 (xviii). The majority approached the
question by, first, ascertaining what was meant by “trade mark” in
1900.57 It then considered whether the mark in issue, a “worker’s
trade mark,” was a trade mark within the meaning as understood at
that time.58 As a “worker’s trade mark” was not within the
connotation of legal meaning for the species of property known as
“trade marks” in 1900, the marks under consideration were held not
to be “trade marks” for the purposes of the legislative power. 59
Chief Justice Griffith, after identifying the elements of a
trademark in 1900, said:
With regard to this species of property the power of the Parliament
is absolute. They can prescribe the conditions on which it may be
acquired, retained, or enjoyed; they may possibly even prohibit its
enjoyment altogether; but they cannot, by calling something else by
the name of “trade mark,” create a new and different kind of
industrial property. 60

Additionally, Justice Barton said:
[I]t is to the meaning in 1900 that we must look, for the plain
reason that the Constitution previously framed in Australia became
law in that year, and the framers cannot, of course, have had in
their minds meanings which had not then come into existence. 61

Justice O’Connor also discussed the essential features of a trade
mark in 1900 and said:
I take it, therefore, as established that the concept covered by the
legal expression “trade mark,” as used by the legislature, the
Courts, and the commercial community in England and Australia at
the time of the passing of the Constitution, necessarily involved the
two essentials I have mentioned. It would follow that the power

56. (1908) 6 CLR 469.
57. Id. at 500–03, 508–13 (Griffith, CJ); id. at 521–25, 529–30 (Barton, J.); id. at 531, 534–
38 (O’Connor, J.).
58. See sources cited supra note 57.
59. See sources cited supra note 57.
60. Brewery Employees’ Union, 6 CLR at 513.
61. Id. at 521.
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conferred upon the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws in
respect of trade marks extends only to trade marks having these
essential qualities, and that it cannot extend to any mark used in
trade which is wanting in any of those essentials. Nor can the
Commonwealth Parliament give itself jurisdiction merely by
declaring that a mark created by its authority for use in trade is a
trade mark within the meaning of the Constitution. It cannot thus
expand its powers by its own legislative act and so assume a larger
control over the internal trade of a State than the Constitution has
conferred on it. 62

Justice Higgins, (who, with Justice Isaacs, was in the minority),
took a broader view of the powers available to the Commonwealth
Parliament. His Honour reasoned that power to make laws with
respect to trade marks is not the same as power to regulate or
enforce trade marks. 63 Relevantly, his Honour observed by way of
analogy, “Under the power to make laws with respect to ‘marriage’ I
should say that the Parliament could prescribe what unions are to be
regarded as marriages.” 64
This minority view that would support an ability to change the
connotation of a power has not been accepted, as appears from the
more recent authority cited above. However, even acceptance of this
approach would still place legislation with regard to homosexual
marriages beyond the scope of the marriage power. This appears
from what follows the dictum cited above:
No doubt, we are to ascertain the meaning of “trade marks” as in 1900.
But having ascertained that meaning, we have then to find the
extent . . . of the “power to make laws with respect to trade marks.”
The usage in 1900 gives us the central type; it does not give us the
circumference of the power. To find the circumference of the power,

62. Id. at 541. While there is a flavor of the reserved powers doctrine in the majority
judgments, which was overturned in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co
(1920) 28 CLR 129, the fall of that doctrine does not affect the validity of the reasoning in
relation to constitutional interpretation. This is made apparent by Davis and Ors v The
Commonwealth of Australia (1988) 166 CLR 79 in which case Chief Justice Mason, Justice Deane,
and Justice Gaudron accepted, by way of illustration, that the denotation of trade marks had
increased, but did not doubt the correctness of the majority’s approach to the connotation of the
power. Id. at 96–97. For a treatment of the reserved powers doctrine, see GABRIEL MOENS & JOHN
TRONE, LUMB AND MOENS’ THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA ANNOTATED
203–05 (6th ed. 2001).
63. Brewery Employees’ Union, 6 CLR at 610.
64. Id.
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we take as a centre the thing named - trade marks - with the meaning
as in 1900; but it is a mistake to treat the centre as the radius. 65

His Honour further stated that the proponents of the majority
view were treating the power to deal with trade marks like a power
to deal with cattle. 66 If a beast did not come within the term “cattle,”
as it was understood in 1900, there was no power to make laws with
respect to it. His Honour reasoned that the difference between cattle
and trade marks was that the boundaries of the class “cattle” was
fixed by external nature, while the concept of “trade marks” is a
social construct. 67

2. Analogy with the institution of the jury
There is also an analogy to be drawn between the institution of
marriage and that of the jury. In Cheatle and Another v The Queen 68 the
High Court considered the meaning of “jury.” Section 80 of the
Constitution requires that the trial on indictment of an offence
against any law of the Commonwealth must be by jury. 69 Section
57(1) of the Juries Act 1927 (SA) allowed for majority verdicts. 70
However the High Court held that section 80 of the Constitution
required a jury verdict to be unanimous. 71 After examining the
history of the institution of trial by jury the Court said:
It follows from what has been said above that the history of
criminal trial by jury in England and in this country up until the
time of Federation establishes that, in 1900, it was an essential
feature of the institution that an accused person could not be
convicted otherwise than by the agreement or consensus of all the
jurors. It is well settled that the interpretation of a constitution
such as ours is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions
are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to

65. Id. The center or essence of marriage in 1900 was “the voluntary union for life of one
man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.” R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379, 391 (quoting
Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242, 259–60). A law expressly contrary to that essence, would,
in the reasoning of Justice Higgins, be a law that sought to change the center of the power and
would, therefore, be beyond power.
66. Brewery Employees’ Union, 6 CLR at 611.
67. Id. 611–16 (referring to several social abstractions to illustrate the point).
68. (1993) 177 CLR 541.
69. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 80.
70. Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 57(a).
71. Cheatle, 177 CLR at 560–61. See also Katsuno v R (1999) 199 CLR 40 (adopting the
reasoning of Cheatle).
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be read in the light of the common law’s history. In the context of
the history of criminal trial by jury, one would assume that
[section] 80’s directive that the trial to which it refers must be by
jury was intended to encompass the requirement of unanimity. 72

C. The Legal Nature and Essence of Marriage
On the legal nature of marriage, Justice Brennan 73 did not
consider marriage to be a social construct. Rather, in The Queen v L, 74
his Honour cited with approval eighteenth and nineteenth century
dicta 75 in support of the observation that marriage is “a contract
according to the law of nature, antecedent to civil institution, . . . a
contract of the greatest importance in civil institutions . . . .” 76
In that case, his Honour also observed that the definition of
marriage as ‘the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman,
to the exclusion of all others’ was one that had been
followed in this country and by this Court” and that it was “the
definition adopted by the Family Law Act, [section] 43(a) [] which
requires a court exercising jurisdiction under that Act to have
regard to ‘the need to preserve and protect the institution of
marriage as the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all
others voluntarily entered into for life.’ 77

In Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v The Commonwealth of
Australia,78 Justice McTiernan made the following observation on
‘marriage’:
The term marriage bears its own limitations and Parliament cannot
enlarge its meaning. In the context – the Constitution – the term
“marriage” should receive its full grammatical and ordinary sense:
plainly in this context it means only monogamous marriage. In my
view, the term in par. (xxi.) refers to marriage as a social
transaction: but as the term marks the outer limits of the power
conferred by par. (xxi.) its meaning is not imprecise. In my view,

72.
73.
74.
75.

Chealte, at 552 (citations omitted).

As His Honour then was.
(1991) 174 CLR 379.
Lindo v Belisaro, [1795] Eng. Rep. 4123, (1795) 1 Hag. Con. 216 at 230–31 (Eng.);
Hyde v Hyde (1866) 1 P.D. 130, 144 (Eng.).
76. R v L, 174 CLR at 391–92.
77. Id.
78. (1962) 107 CLR 529.
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the term cannot be extended further than to embrace uniting in
marriage and the status of marriage. 79

Also, Chief Justice Dixon said:
It may be said at once that the power conferred by [section] 51
(xxi.) should receive no narrow or restrictive construction. In Quick
and Garran at p. 608 a wide connotation of the words “with respect
to marriage” is suggested by a reference to a denotation which
perhaps needs a little explanation. For it covers “consequences of
the relation including the status of the married parties, their
mutual rights and obligations, the legitimacy of children and their
civil rights.” These are indefinite and highly abstract words but the
status of the married parties evidently refers to the particular legal
position . . . which unmarried persons do not share; their mutual
rights and obligations means those arising out of the married state
and the legitimacy of children refers to the status of children born to

them in wedlock. 80

There seems no room for doubt that in 1900 marriage was “the
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion
of all others.” 81 That definition has been accepted by the High Court
in Calverley v Green, 82 where Justice Mason and Justice Brennan (as
they both then were) said, “The exclusive union for life which is
undertaken by both spouses to a valid marriage . . . remains the
foundation of the legal institution of marriage.” 83
In Re F.; Ex parte F 84 the High Court unanimously disallowed
section 5(1)(e)(i) of the Family Law Act which deemed a child of one
of the parties to a marriage who was ordinarily a member of the
household of the husband and wife to be a child of the marriage.
Justice Brennan (as he then was), with whom Chief Justice Gibbs
and Justice Wilson generally agreed, made the following observation:
“Marriage” as a subject of legislative power embraces those
relationships which the law (leaving aside statutes enacted in

79. Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 543. It is clear that his Honour considered that the connotation of the power
was that the parties to a marriage were a man and a woman.
81. Hyde v Hyde, (1866) 1 P.D. 130 (Eng.); see also Harrod v Harrod (1854) 1 K.&J. 4, 15,
16 (Eng.); HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND VOL. 13, 351 (3d ed. 1951); BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER,
FORM OF SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGE (1662); Genesis 1:24–25.
82. (1984) 155 CLR 242.
83. Id. at 259–60; see also Khan v Khan [1963] VR 203, 204.
84. (1986) 161 CLR 376.
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purported exercise of the power) recognizes as the relationships
which subsist between husband, wife and the children of the
marriage. Statutes enacted in purported exercise of the power
cannot extend the scope of the power: only those relationships
which are already embraced within the subject are amenable to
regulation by a law enacted in exercise of the power. The subject
does not embrace the relationship between, on the one hand, the
spouses and, on the other, a child born of an extra-marital
association of a spouse with another person. To treat such a child
as a child of the marriage of the spouses when he or she has not
been adopted by them is to exclude or diminish the relationship
between the child and the parent who is not one of the spouses. 85

In Fisher v Fisher 86 Justice Brennan said, “The relationships
between husband, wife and the children of a marriage, which are at
the heart of the marriage power, are essentially personal, not
proprietary.” 87
In Re Cormick, 88 Chief Justice Gibbs said,
It is now well settled that “marriage” in [section] 51(xxi) includes
the relationship or institution of marriage and, since the protection
and nurture of the children of the marriage is at the very heart of
the relationship, that the power to make laws with respect to
marriage enables the Parliament to define and enforce the rights of
a party to the marriage with respect to the custody and
guardianship of a child of the marriage. The rights and duties of the
parties to a marriage, with respect to the children of the marriage,
arise directly out of the marriage relationship, and a law defining,
regulating or modifying the incidents of the marriage relationship is
a law with respect to marriage. 89

It would appear then on an originalist interpretation, references
to “marriage” and “matrimonial causes” in the text of section 51
would most likely be construed to refer to the legal relationship
between a man and a woman as it was known in 1900. Such an
interpretation makes federal same-sex marriage legislation
questionable at best and most likely invalid if passed.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
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(1984) 156 CLR 170.
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D. External Affairs as a Source of Legislative Power

There is the possibility that the external affairs power, found in
section 51 (xxix) of the federal Constitution, could allow the
Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for same-sex marriage. 90 To
invoke this head of power, a binding international covenant to so
legislate needs to be identified.
To date, no covenant sufficient for that purpose has been
identified by proponents of same-sex marriage. It seems that a clear
obligation to legislate for same-sex marriage can be identified. At
best, it would seem that proponents might identify wording in a
covenant that might permit such marriages, but not to oblige
Australia, as a covenanting state to so legislate.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) works
upon the same assumption underlying the marriage power, namely
that marriage is the union between a man and a woman.
Article 16 of the UDHR provides:
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race,
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a
family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during
marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 91

If there is no apparent support for an obligation to provide for
same-sex marriage under the UDHR, neither does there seem to
be any support in other international covenants. Article 23(2) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for
example, similarly recognizes the right of men and women of
marriageable age to marry and found a family but does not extend
to same gender couples. 92 Neither does there seem to be any
90. IAN IRELAND, LAW AND BILLS DIGEST GRP., INFO. AND RESEARCH SERVS., RESEARCH
NOTE: THE HIGH COURT AND THE MEANING OF ‘MARRIAGE’ IN SECTION 51(XXI) OF THE
CONSTITUTION (Feb. 12, 2003), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/m/200101/02m17.pdf.
91. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
92. The Law Council of Australia Submission to the Senate of April 2, 2012, LAW
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potential support from European human rights provisions or the
treatment of claims to particular marriage rights claims made in the
European Court of Human Rights. 93
Without a clear international obligation to legislate for same-sex
marriage, there is simply no basis for use of the external affairs
power.

E. Conclusion on the Federal Ability to Pass Legislation Permitting Same-Sex
Marriage
One can never predict the outcome of constitutional litigation in
a court of last resort with absolute certainty. However, unless the
High Court were to depart from a considerable body of precedent
and refuse to adopt either an approach to the construction of the
relevant power that departed radically from its previous approaches
to the relevant powers and the meaning of marriage, it would seem
that there are very strong arguments as to why any federal Act may
well be declared as being beyond Parliament’s power.
III. COULD VALID STATE LEGISLATION BE PASSED PERMITTING SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE IN AUSTRALIA?
It seems generally accepted that prior to 1961, states could likely
have passed valid laws permitting same-sex marriage because they
were not tied to express heads of legislative power in the same way
as the federal Parliament. 94 The question now is whether the

COUNCIL OF AUSTL., LAW COUNCIL SUBMISSION TO THE SENATE INQUIRY ON MARRIAGE EQUALITY
AMENDMENT BILL 2010 74–75 (Apr. 2, 2012), available at

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/comple
ted_inquiries/2010-13/marriage_equality_2012/submissions.htm, seems to acknowledge as much in
its reference to Joslin v New Zealand, Communication No. 902/1999, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 at 214
(2002), where it was held that states were only required to recognize the union between a man
and a woman who wanted to marry each other.
93. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights arts. 8, 12, 14, Nov. 4. 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 (identifying a right to respect for private and family life, prohibiting
discrimination, and identifying a right to marriage, respectively); Schalk & Kopf v Austria,
App. No. 30141/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 995 (2010) (finding no breach of Articles 12 and 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and holding that states have no obligation to provide
marriage for same-sex couples);
Gas & Dubois c. France, App. No. 25951/07 (2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109571#{“itemid”:[“001109571”]} (finding no breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human
Rights when a lesbian couple was refused an adoption).
94. There is an argument, along originalist lines, that could be advanced that the state
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Marriage Act 1961, including the 2004 amendments to confirm the
definition of marriage as being between a man and a woman and to
exclude recognition of foreign same-sex marriage, prevents the
passage of state laws permitting such marriages.
Although there have been various state bills drafted, to date, the
Tasmanian bill is the only bill to have passed any legislative chamber
and to have been the subject of extensive debate in the chamber in
which it was defeated. 95 Therefore, the Tasmanian bill will be the
focus of this section. In voting against the Bill, several opponents
cited constitutional arguments and the consequent costs of litigation
as reasons to vote the Bill down.
The Tasmanian Same-Sex Marriage Bill 2012 (the Bill) provided at
clause 3 that “same sex marriage means the lawful union of two
people of the same sex to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily
entered into for life.” 96 It should be noted that the definition mimics
the definition of marriage in the federal Marriage Act 1961 with the
difference that rather than a union between a man and a woman, the
Bill purported to provide for same-sex marriage as a union between
two people of the same-sex.
The Bill then purported to establish a regime for same-sex
“marriage.” 97 In essence, the Bill clearly intended to create a
complete system parallel to that created by the Marriage Act, but to
apply exclusively to same-sex marriages.

legislative power is commensurately constitutionally impaired by section 106 of the federal
Constitution. If the definition of marriage is restricted to what was known as marriage in
1900, the state constitutions are likewise restricted. Section 106 provides, “[T]he
Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall, subject to this Constitution, continue
as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the
State, as the case may be, until altered in accordance with the Constitution of the State.”
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s. 106.
95. First Step For Gay Marriage Laws, ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2012, 8:56 AM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-28/first-step-for-gay-marriage-laws/4227122; Dylan
Carmichael, Same Sex Marriage Act 2012 (Tamania) Debate, Day 1, DYLAN CARMICHAEL’S BLOG
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://dcarm85.wordpress.com/2012/09/.
96. Same-Sex Marriage Bill 2012 (Tas).
97. Part 1 of the Bill contains the interpretation section, which contains the definition of
same-sex “marriage.” Id. Part 2 sets up a scheme in relation to same-sex “marriages” and deals
with marriageable age, procedure for solemnisation of same-sex marriages, marriage certificates
and offences. Id. Part 3 deals with dissolution and annulment of same-sex “marriages”, Part 4
with proceedings for financial adjustment and maintenance and, Part 5 with financial
arrangements. Id. Part 6 addresses recognition of same-sex “marriages” under corresponding
laws, Part 7 with authorized celebrants, and Part 8 with miscellaneous matters. Id.
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A. The Marriage Act
The Marriage Act established a regime for dealing with marriage
in Australia. Part I of the Act deals with preliminary matters. This
part defines marriage as “the union of a man and a woman to the
exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.” 98
Part I also contains section 6, which provides that the Marriage
Act does not exclude the operation of State laws with respect to the
registration of marriages. It seems clear that this provision is
intended to permit only limited concurrent operation for state
laws. 99 Part VA deals with the recognition of foreign marriages. 100
Section 88B (4), which is part of Part VA, adopts the Marriage Act
definition of marriage in relation to the question of the recognition
of foreign marriages. 101 Section 88EA, which is also in Part VA,
provides:
A union solemnised in a foreign country between:
a man and a another man; or
a woman and another woman:
must not be recognised as a marriage in Australia. 102

While it may be pointed out that section 88B does not seek to
deal with State “marriage” relationships, it is a fair response to make
that no such legal institution was in contemplation at the time
because the states had acquiesced in the Commonwealth plenary
exercise of power. As is apparent from the earlier discussion, there
never has been any other legal institution described as “marriage” in
Australia other than as between man and a woman.
It seems clear that the Marriage Act operates to create a code in
relation to the institution of marriage in Australia other than in
respect of registration. Indeed, when the Marriage Act was introduced

98. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 5(1).
99. Other Parts of the Act deal with matters relating directly or indirectly with marriage.
Part IA addresses marriage education, Part II the question marriageable age and the marriage of
minors, Part III deals with void marriages and Part IV with the solemnization of marriages in
Australia. Part V addresses marriages of members of the Defence Force Overseas. Part VI deals
with the legitimation of children by virtue of marriage of parents, Part VII with offences, Part
VIII with transitional provisions and Part IX with miscellaneous matters.
100. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s VA.
101. Id. s 88B(4).
102. Id. s 88EA.
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to Parliament in 1961, the then-Attorney-General, Sir Garfield
Barwick, said that the purpose of the legislation was to “produce a
marriage code suitable to present-day Australian needs.” 103
It appears a part of that purpose was to rid the legal landscape of
the different pieces of State legislation on the topic of “marriage.” In
this regard, the observations by the Attorney-General as to state laws
in 1961 are pertinent now:
At the present time, the marriage laws of the several States and of
the Territories to which this bill applies are diverse. The
recognition in one State of the marriage status acquired in another
rests entirely upon the rules of private international law worked out
over many generations to regulate such questions as between
independent, and in relation to each other, foreign States. The bill
would replace this diverse body of statutory law and render
unnecessary any resort to the rules of private international law to
determine, in the Commonwealth or in any Territory, the efficacy
and validity of a marriage solemnised or a legitimation effected
within the Commonwealth and the Territories to which the bill
applies, or indeed outside the Commonwealth if the marriage is
celebrated under part 4. 104

B. Validity of the Bill if Passed into Law: The Inconsistency Question –
Section 109 of the Constitution
There is an obvious question of inconsistency between the
Marriage Act and the Bill under section 109 of the federal
Constitution. Section 109 states, “When a law of a State is
inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall
prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be
invalid.” 105 “Invalidity” in the context of section 109, means that the
state law is rendered inoperative as long as the Commonwealth law
is effective. If the Commonwealth law were to be repealed, then the
State law would revive. 106

103. Olivia Rundle, An Examination of Relationship Registration Schemes in Australia, 25
AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 121, 126 (2011) (quoting Garfield Barwick, The Commonwealth Marriage Act
1961, 3 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 277, 277 (1962)).
104. Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 May 1960, 2001 (Garfield
Barwick, Attorney-General).
105. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 109.
106. Butler v Attorney General (Vic) (1961) 106 CLR 268.
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There are two tests that the High Court has developed in order
to determine whether a State law is inconsistent with a
Commonwealth law. The first is whether there is a direct
inconsistency between the laws.107 The second is whether the
Commonwealth law evinces an intention to ‘cover the field’ and so
an indirect inconsistency is created in the event that a State law
purports to enter that field. 108
For section 109 to come into play, there must first be a valid law
enacted by the Commonwealth parliament and an otherwise valid
law passed by the particular state parliament. 109 If one or the other
law is otherwise invalid there is no need for recourse to section 109.
Since there has never been any doubt expressed that the Marriage
Act (including the amendment to introduce the definition of
“marriage” made by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004) is a valid
enactment of the Commonwealth Parliament, there is a question of
invalidity whenever a state act purports to enter the legislative fields
of marriage and the definition of marriage. 110
In a unanimous decision concerning section 109, Telstra v
Worthing, 111 the High Court elucidated the tests for invalidity under
the section:
The applicable principles are well settled. Cases still arise where
one law requires what the other forbids. It was held in Wallis v
Downard-Pickford (North Queensland) Pty Ltd that a State law which
incorporated into certain contracts a term which a law of the
Commonwealth forbad was invalid. However, it is clearly
established that there may be inconsistency within the meaning of s

107. That is, it is impossible to obey both laws, such as where one law requires or permits
what the other prohibits. Examples are discussed in GABRIEL MOENS & JOHN TRONE, LUMB AND
MOENS’ THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA ANNOTATED 360–362 (2007)
and include R v Brisbane Licensing Court ex parte Daniell (1920) 28 CLR 23; Telstra Corp Ltd v
Worthing (1999) 197 CLR 61; Clyde Engineering v Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466; Viskauskas v
Niland (1983) 153 CLR 280; Dao v Australian Postal Commission (1987) 162 CLR 317.
108. The Commonwealth statute may evince such an intention either by express words or
by necessary implication. The intention to legislate exhaustively in a particular legislative field to
the exclusion of any State legislation will, if found, produce an indirect inconsistency, referred to
as “covering the field”. Examples are discussed in GABRIEL MOENS & JOHN TRONE, LUMB AND
MOENS’ THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA ANNOTATED 360–362 (2007)
and include Ex Parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472; Stock Motor Ploughs Ltd v Forsyth (1932) 48
CLR 128; Commercial Radio Coffs Harbour Ltd v Fuller (1986) 161 CLR 47; The Queen v L (1991)
174 CLR 379.
109. Bayside Council v Telstra Corp. (2004) 216 CLR 595, 628.
110. Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 519.
111. (1999) 197 CLR 61.
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109 although it is possible to obey both the Commonwealth law
and the State law. . . .
In Victoria v The Commonwealth, Dixon J stated two propositions
which are presently material. The first was:
“When a State law, if valid, would alter, impair or detract from the
operation of a law of the Commonwealth Parliament, then to that
extent it is invalid.”
The second, which followed immediately in the same passage, was:
“Moreover, if it appears from the terms, the nature or the subject
matter of a Federal enactment that it was intended as a complete
statement of the law governing a particular matter or set of rights
and duties, then for a State law to regulate or apply to the same
matter or relation is regarded as a detraction from the full operation
of the Commonwealth law and so as inconsistent.”
The second proposition may apply in a given case where the first
does not, yet, . . . if the first proposition applies, then s 109 of the
Constitution operates even if, and without the occasion to consider
whether, the second proposition applies. 112

Thus, the test as to whether there is a direct inconsistency
between the Marriage Act and the Bill if it had been enacted is
whether the Bill would “alter, impair or detract” from the operation
of the Marriage Act. There is a strong argument that it would detract
from the creation of a single legislative code created to deal with the
legislative topic of “marriage.” The Marriage Act created a single
regime for marriage in Australia. With respect to legal relations
between same-sex couples, the express effect of the definition of
“marriage” contained in the Act is that such relationships are not
within the definition of “marriage.” Moreover, the Act would appear
to fortify that definition by forbidding recognition of foreign
marriages between same-sex couples in Australia. The Bill sought to
alter that regime. It also sought to disrupt the universal operation of
the federal Act throughout Australia as a code in relation to
“marriage.” By creating an exceptional enclave, it would have
impaired and detracted from the Marriage Act. The Bill sought to
provide recognition for state “marriages” that, with respect to
foreign “marriages” are forbidden by section 88EA. This supports a

112. Id. at 76–77.

547

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/29/2014 10:01 AM

2013

view that the Bill, if passed into law, would have been found to be
inconsistent with the Marriage Act.113
It may be argued that the saving of certain state laws in relation
to the registration of marriages in section 6 of the Marriage Act
detracts from the argument that the Marriage Act “covers the field.”
However, section 6 closely circumscribes the field in which a state
law may operate—that is, only in relation to the registration of
marriages as opposed to their solemnization. Indeed the provision
strengthens the “covering the field” argument as it strongly implies,
by the absence of an express preservation in respect to
solemnization, that any state powers for creating a new and
alternative regime for solemnization of “marriage” are not preserved.
If the argument for saving state laws had any weight, one would
expect there to be express saving provisions in the Marriage Act
itself. As an example of legislation that contains state law saving
provisions, a clear intention is expressed in both the Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) and its successor, the Competition and Consumer
Act 2010 (Cth) that state laws in relation to certain specified matters
have continued valid operation. One of those was cited by the High
Court in Master Education Services v Ketchell where the Court made
reference to section 51AEA of the TPA:
Section 51AEA states:
“It is the Parliament’s intention that a law of a State or Territory
should be able to operate concurrently with this Part unless the law
is directly inconsistent with this Part.”
The legislative purpose apparent in s 51AEA is to deny any
intention to “cover the field” in the sense of the authorities
concerning s 109 of the Constitution. 114

It has been argued that because section 88EA expressly
repudiates foreign same-sex “marriages,” but does not expressly

113. This is consistent with the opinion published in 2006 by Professor Geoffrey Lindell in
relation to a similar Bill previously before the parliament in Tasmania. Geoffrey Lindell, State
Legislative Power to Enact Same-Sex Marriage Legislation, and the Effect of the Marriage Act 1961
(Cth) as Amended by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth), 9 CONST. L. & POL’Y REV. 25 (2006).
He was of the view there was a direct inconsistency between the 2005 Bill and the Marriage Act.
Id. at 26–28.
114. (2008) 236 CLR 101, 108. See also section 75(1) of the TPA which also preserves the
state legislative capacity to regulate conduct in relation to consumer market transactions. Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 75(1).
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repudiate domestic same-sex marriages, the Marriage Act leaves room
for state same-sex marriage legislation. 115 But there was good reason
for the Marriage Act not to mention domestic same-sex marriages.
First, the Marriage Act, as amended, provides national definition of
marriage as being a union between a man and a woman for life. 116
What reason was there for dealing with the possibility of domestic
same-sex marriages 117 when they had been expressly excluded in
domestic law by the insertion of the definition? 118
If the Bill were to recognize internationally contracted same-sex
“marriages,” that recognition would run directly contrary to the
provisions of section 88EA. If it did not, it would begin the very
fragmentation of the concept of marriage that the Marriage Act seeks
to avoid by creating at least three diverse species of legal marriage:
marriage under the federal Act, defined as between a man and a
woman and recognized in all states and territories and
internationally; a form of same-sex marriage, recognized only in
Tasmania; and internationally contracted same-sex marriages, not
recognized in Tasmania, but in all respects appearing the same as
those contracted in Tasmania. The validity of any “same-sex
marriage” would invite inquiry as to the place it was contracted—an
inquiry the Commonwealth Act currently precludes. The intention of
the federal Act is that there be only one legally recognized form of
marriage in Australia.
Professor George Williams, in an opinion in relation to the 2005
Tasmanian Bill, has expressed the view that the proposed state law
would not have been rendered inoperative by the Marriage Act
because they would operate in separate fields. 119 Central to
Professor Williams’s argument is that the Marriage Act, after the
2004 amendments, deals with “different type[s] of union[s]” leaving
the way clear for the states to legislate in relation to same-sex
marriage. 120 With respect, the fatal and obvious flaw in this

115. George Williams, Advice regarding the proposed Same-Sex Marriage, 9 CONST. L. & POL’Y
REV. 21 (2006).
116. Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) s 5(1).
117. See Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 2004, 29356
(Philip Ruddock, Minster for Immigration), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard.
118. Lindell, supra note 113, at 31.
119. Williams, supra note 115, at 24.
120. Id. at 23.
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argument is that it is contrary to the express terms of the Marriage
Act. The Marriage Act does not purport to deal with “different sex
marriage” at all. At the time of passage, there was no such legal
institution in Australia. The adjectival phrase “different sex” begs
the question of the possibility of “same sex” marriage, when it is
clear that the intention has been to exclude such an institution from
Australia. 121 The phrase “different sex marriage” is tautological. In
2004, there was (and continues to be) only one legal institution
described as “marriage” in Australia. The amended Marriage Act
defines “marriage” as a union between a man and a woman for
life. 122 It deals with and establishes a complete statement of law in
relation to marriage. Any union that is outside the terms of the
Marriage Act is therefore not “marriage.” 123
To speak of “heterosexual” marriage in Australia is a legal
tautology. It is a construct that is capable of providing neither logical
legal space nor foundation for the concept of any other type of
marriage—be it homosexual, trans-sexual, bigamous, polyandrous,
polygynous, or otherwise. 124

C. Inconsistency with Respect to Maintenance and Property
The presence in the Bill of Parts 4 and 5, which dealt with the
incidents of separation, divorce, and property disputes, created a
further potential inconsistency between Commonwealth and state
law.
By the Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2006
(Tas), Tasmania referred powers to the Commonwealth in relation
to financial matters between de facto partners. The definition of a de

121. Id.
122. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 5(1).
123. And the Commonwealth legislation was passed in the knowledge that forms of de
facto union were the subject of legal recognition in the respective states, including same-sex
relationships.
124. When testifying before the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social
Policy and Legal Affairs concerning two same-sex marriage laws, Professor Williams did not
assert that his opinion was definitive in relation to state laws on same-sex marriage. Instead, he
said that there was “no clear answer” to this issue. Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, 16 April, 2012 (George
Williams) available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=
COMMITTEES;id=committees%2Fcommrep%2Fd4627e5a-48ef-42e7-9297d772ce9bdf14%2F0002;query=Id%3A%22committees%2Fcommrep%2Fd4627e5a-48ef-42e79297-d772ce9bdf14%2F0000%22.
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facto relationship in that Act was “a marriage-like relationship
between two persons.” 125
In Graham v Paterson, Chief Justice Latham said:
[T]he reference of matters under s. 51(xxxvii) does not deprive the
State Parliament of any power. It results in the creation of an
additional power in the Commonwealth Parliament. If the
Commonwealth Parliament exercises such a power, s. 109 of the
Constitution may become applicable, with the result that if a law of
the State with respect to a matter referred was inconsistent with a
law of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth law would prevail
and the State law to the extent of the inconsistency would be
invalid. But unless the Commonwealth Parliament exercises the
power to legislate with respect to the matter referred, no effect
whatever is produced in relation to the operation of State laws. 126

The Commonwealth Parliament has now exercised the very
powers referred to it by the States, including Tasmania, in enacting
the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Matters and Other Measures) Act
2008. 127 That Act provides that all matters in relation to de facto
financial matters will be dealt with by the Family Court, which
includes all ‘marriage-like’ unions. 128 The Bill purported to set up a
different regime without withdrawing the referred power. While
clause 47 attempts to accommodate Family Court proceedings by
providing that proceedings in the Supreme Court will be adjourned if
there are concurrent proceedings in the Family Court, it entered into
the field covered by the Commonwealth Act and, so, would likely be
inconsistent and inoperative under section 109.

D. Conclusion on the State Capacity to Pass Same-Sex Marriage Laws
As observed previously, the outcome of constitutional litigation
is notoriously difficult to predict. However, it would seem that
section 109 and the Marriage Act most likely constitute insuperable
barriers to state legislation on the subject of same-sex marriage
while the Marriage Act remains in its current form.

125.
126.
127.
128.

Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2006 (Tas) s 3(1).
Graham v Paterson (1950) 81 CLR 1, 19–20.
Family Law Amendment (De Facto Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 (Cth).
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Opponents of legislation permitting same-sex marriage in
Australia have presented several species of argument to avoid an
intolerable result. Opponents argue that an institution, central to the
meaning of the community as they perceive it would have been
irreversibly changed. Freedoms to speak and act upon beliefs in
relation to marriage, as we currently know it, would have been
forever lost or, at least, compromised.
They presented passionate arguments as to why the legislation
should not be passed. But of all of the arguments presented, it was
the constitutional arguments—reasons why the legislation could not
be validly passed—that gave the opponents of the legislation a voice
that could be heard, understood, and used to persuade.
Although Australia has no bill of rights guaranteeing any of the
freedoms that might have been encroached by passage of same-sex
marriage legislation, it does have a robust set of constitutional
arrangements with courts to enforce them, the combination of which
provides a brake upon exercises of legislative and executive power.
This is not a counsel of complacency. The protections could and
should be stronger. But by a strange serendipity, those who opposed
strengthening of the rights are the beneficiaries, on this occasion, of
the protections that are in place.
In one of his recent novels, 1Q84, Haruki Murakami describes
two parallel universes that existed in 1984.129 The first is the 1984
of history as we know it—the true 1984 of our world. The second is
a world that in many respects closely resembles 1984, but on closer
inspection has some strange differences. It is 1Q84—an Orwellian
dystopia, illuminated at night by two moons. In the parallel universe
that is 1Q84, characters apparently familiar to the protagonists from
1984 behave in strange, intimidating ways. What separates 1984
from 1Q84 is a mesh fence with a gap just large enough for the
protagonists to pass through.
In a sense, the only separation that Australia might have from
the world that might otherwise be is the mesh fence of its
constitutional arrangements.

129. HARUKI MURAKAMI, 1Q84 (2009).
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